COMMENTS
PROCEDURES TO CHALLENGE THE PROCESS
OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

The process of an administrative agency has been said not to be open to
judicial review until the agency seeks judicial enforcement of its summons or
subpoena.' This view follows from the belief that the process of an administrative agency is not self-enforcing,2 since the agency itself is without power
to compel compliance with its subpoena by threat of citation for civil or
criminal contempt. 3 It is thought that if the subpoenaed witness refuses to
appear and to testify or to produce evidence demanded of him, and the agency
wishes to compel the witness' compliance with its process, it must petition
the courts for an order directing compliance. 4 The Federal Aviation Act of
1958,5 for example, provides that the Civil Aeronautics Board may issue
subpoenas compelling attendance at investigations6 made pursuant to the Act
1See FPC v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U.S. 375 (1938); FTC v. Claire Furnace Co.,
274 U.S. 160 (1927); FTC v. Maynard Coal Co., 22 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1927); Fleming
v. Arsenal Bldg. Corp., 38 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
2 ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 485 (1894); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Boland,
85 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1936).
3 Theview taken in ICCv. Brimson, supra note 2, is that the power to punish for contempt
is purely judicial. For comment on the Brimson view, see 1 DAvis, ADiMInTRATwE LAW
TRATISE § 3.11 (1958) [hereinafter cited as DAvis]; Note, 35 CoLuM. L. Rav. 578 (1935);
Comment, 71 I-Lv. L. REv. 1541 (1958). McGrain v. Daughterty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927),
holding that legislative bodies may punish for contempt partially undercuts this position,
but that case rests in part on the historic practice of legislatures. Indeed some state agencies
may punish for contempt. See 1 DAVIS § 3.11; 3 Loss, SEcuRrIEs RGuLAnTION 1963 n.57
(1961).
4
E.g., (FTC) 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1958); (SEC) 48 Stat. 899 (1934), 15
U.S.C. § 78u(c) (1958); (FPC) 49 Stat. 856 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 825f(c) (1958); (Tariff
Comm'n) 46 Stat. 699 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1333 (1958); (IRS) INT. REv. CODE OF 1954
§ 7604(a); (NLRB) 62 Stat. 991 (1948), 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1958); (VA) 38 U.S.C. § 3313
(1958); (ABC) 68 Stat. 959 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2281 (1958); (FMC) 64 Stat. 1274, 1277
(1950), 46 U.S.C. §§ 826, 828 (1958); (FCC) 75 Stat. 422 (1961), 47 U.S.C. §§ 409(f), (g)
(1962); (ICC) 62 Stat. 909 (1948), 49 U.S.C. §§ 12(2), (3) (1958); (FAA) 72 Stat. 792 (1958),
49 U.S.C. § 1484 (1958). In addition, the IRS has the power to seek "an attachment against
[the recalcitrant witness] as for contempt .... " INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 7604(b). This
provision is generally treated as a means of seeking a judicial enforcement order and does
not dictate an automatic penalty; see Brody v. United States, 243 F.2d 378 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied,354 U.S. 923 (1957); Sale v. United States, 228 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1956). But compare
In re Wolrich, 84 F. Supp. 481, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (dictum). See text at note 43 infra.
5 72 Stat. 737-806 (1958), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1958).
6 72 Stat. 792 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1484(b) (1958). Though most agencies have at least
this power, a few-e.g., Patent Office, 35 U.S.C. § 24 (1958), and the Board of Arbitration
under the Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1197 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 157(3)(b) (1958)-are
empowered only to seek issuance of subpoenas by the clerk of the district court.
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and that, in case of disobedience to its subpoena, the Board may seek the aid
of the courts. 7 "Any court of the United States... may, in case of contumacy
or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person, issue an order requiring
such person to appear before the Board... and any failure to obey such
order of the court may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof."8 Before any order of the court will issue compelling complete or partial
compliance with the demands of the agency, there is a quite limited review
of the agency process. 9 If the recipient continues in default and the court, on
either its own motion or the agency's petition for enforcement of the first court
order,10 orders the witness to show cause why he should not be held in contempt, there is further review in a proceeding in which there is a heavy burden
of proof upon the government." No witness is compelled to comply with the
772 Stat. 792 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1484(c) (1958).
872 Stat. 792 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1484(d) (1958).
9 Following Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946), and Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943), the courts have narrowed the scope of
adjudication and allowed broad discovery powers upon a showing that the respondent's
activities are within the agency's jurisdiction under its enabling act. It is not necessary to
show that there is a complaint before the agency pursuant to which investigation is made
or that the agency has probable cause to believe that there has been a violation of the law
or its rules. See 1 DAvis § 3.12; Comment, supra note 3.
10 The statutes provide only that in case of contumacy the court may enforce its order.
Apparently the usual procedure is for the agency to petition for enforcement. Comment,
supra note 3, at 1543. Insome cases, at least, the application takes the form of a petition
for an attachment for contempt. Sale v. United States, 228 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1956);
Brungger v. Smith, 49 Fed. 124 (1st Cir. 1892).
11Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. NLRB, 137 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1943). Because of the
broadening of the subpoena power of administrative agencies, see note 9, supra,courts have
become increasingly cursory in examining the validity of subpoenas when issuing judicial
orders, and only demands burdensome on their face are usually invalidated at that stage.
Indeed, the decision in CAB v. Hermann, 353 U.S. 322 (1957), allowed denial of a hearing
at the first stage of enforcement where the court used an agency complaint as a standard
in assessing validity. Thus as a practical matter, contempt proceedings may afford the
respondent his first judicial hearing on the merits as to the validity of the subpoena-a
development difficult to reconcile with the court's concern in Application of Colton, 291
F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1961), over the "Draconianism" of the threat of criminal proceedings
without review. The courts may feel that "because the consequences of enforcement of an
order may be more drastic to a respondent than those of enforcement of a subpoena, and
because orders come at the end rather than at the beginning of the administrative process
.. " (Comment, supra note 13, at 1544), denial of prior review of agency subpoenas does
not raise significant constitutional questions. However, review of the validity of the subpoena
at some stage, even if only by way of defense in criminal proceedings, would seem constitutionally requisite. Though the Supreme Court has sometimes denied that review is requisite
where the government action at issue is non-coercive in its effect upon the complaining
individual, see 4 DAvis § 28.19; Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof the
FederalCourts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362, 1383-87 (1953), it has
not done so where coercive action is at issue. Perhaps the most extreme position limiting
review in such cases was that taken by the three dissenters in Estep v. United States, 327
U.S. 114, 134, 144 (1946), who regarded habeas corpus after conviction as adequate review,
thus taking action which, in Professor Hart's words, "turns an ultimate safeguard of law
into an excuse for its violation." Hart, supra, at 1382. But the cases in which the Court
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agency summons or subpoena or is held in contempt for his refusal to comply
without some judicial determination of the merit of any of his objections to
2
the legal sufficiency of the process.'
However, courts denying review until an agency seeks ajudicial enforcement
order have not seriously dealt with the fact that it may be criminal per se to
fail to comply with the process of an administrative agency.13 The Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 provides, for example, that "any person who shall

neglect or refuse to attend and testify, or to answer any lawful inquiry, or
to produce books, papers, or documents, if in his power to do so, in obedience
to the subpoena or lawful requirement of the Board or Administrator, shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be subject to

a-fine of not less than $100. nor more than $5000., or imprisonment for not

more than one year or both."'14 Furthermore, the agency may seek the imposition of these criminal sanctions even where the witness' noncompliance is
based on a good-faith doubt as to the validity of the agency subpoena' 5 and
even though the witness has fully complied with the court order16 issued after
initial violation and thus would not be subject to citation for civil contempt.17
Indeed, the agency may well be able to seek the imposition of these sanctions
8
without even seeking judicial enforcement of the subpoena.'
has supplied review where none has been provided by statute, see 4 DAviS § 28.18, adequately support Professor Hart's generalization that "so long at least as Congress feels impelled
to invoke the assistance of courts, the supremacy of law in their decisions is assured," at
least where rights have not been waived by the parties. Hart, supra, at 1388; cf. 4 DAvis 97.
12
See FTC v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U.S. 160 (1927); Soja v. Davis, 303 F.2d 601 (7th
Cir.), cert. granted, 371 U.S. 810 (1962); E. I. du Pont de Nemours v. Boland, 85 F.2d 12
(2d Cir. 1936); FTC v. Maynard Coal Co., 22 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1927); FTC v. Waltham
Watch Co., 169 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Caplis v. Helvering, 4 F. Supp. 181 (E.D.N.Y.
1933).
13 E.g., (FTC) 38 Stat. 723 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 50 (1958); (SEC) 48 Stat. 899 (1934), 15
U.S.C. § 78u(c) (1958); (FPC) 49 Stat. 856 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 825f(c) (1960); (IRS) INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954 § 7210; (NLRB) 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 162 (1958); (Railway
Retirement Board) 50 Stat. 316 (1937), 45 U.S.C. § 228m (1958). See Eclipse Sleep Prod.
v. FTC, TRADE REG. REp. 70,480 (D. Mass. Sept. 24, 1962) where Wyzanski, J., confidently
asserts that "failure to produce a document or to give evidence before such an order [court
order requiring compliance with FTC subpoena] is issued does not constitute a crime."
14 72 Stat. 785 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1472(g) (1958). This provision differs from similar
provisions of other agencies in that some provide that the criminal noncompliance must
be "willful" (e.g., FPC, NLRB, Railroad Retirement Board) or "without just cause" (e.g.,
SEC). See statutes cited note 13 supra.
's St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961); United States v. Clyde S.S.
Co., 36 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1929).
16 United States v. Clyde S.S. Co., supra note 15; United States v. National Biscuit Co.,
25 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
17 See Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585 (1947).
Is Application of Colton, 291 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Becker, 259 F.2d
869 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied,358 U.S. 929 (1959). Such action, however, might raise serious
questions about the function of the direct penalties and squarely raise the issue of the principle of ExparteYoung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See text at notes 24-27 infra.
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Under conventional doctrine, the subpoenaed witness can challenge the
agency process only at the risk of severe criminal sanctions, for only by refusing to comply with the subpoena and thereby forcing the agency to seek
judicial enforcement of its process may he bring his objections before the
court. Does this lack of provision for review prior to violation constitute a
denial of due process to the defaulting witness? A significant recent decision
of the Second Circuitl9 indicates that it does.20
In Application of Colton,21 the Second Circuit held that a district court had
jurisdiction to entertain a motion to vacate a summons2 2 issued by the Internal
23
Revenue Service and that the district court's decision is final and appealable.
19 Application of Colton, supra note 18. In In re Turner, 309 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1962),
the court noted that the government complained of long delays in its investigations as a
consequence of the Colton holding and declared also that "although we do not now perceive
any reason to doubt the correctness of the Colton decision, we are of course ready, in this
instance as in others, to reexamine a holding on a matter of such public importance if the
government deems that any relevant considerations were overlooked." Id. at 72.
20 Application of Colton, 291 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1961), 75 HARv. L. REV. 1222 (1962).
21 291 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1961).
22 A district court followed Colton in Application of Howard, 210 F. Supp. 301 (W.D.
Pa. 1962), in an opinion devoted more to singing the praises of the Colton court than to legal
analysis. Contra,Reisman v. Caplin, No. 16690, D.C. Cir., Feb. 7, 1963. Jurisdiction is said
to lie in the district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1340 (1958): "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress providing for
any internal revenue ... " In re Turner, 309 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1962). But there is no provision
in the INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 for motions to modify or vacate summonses. Application of
Colton, supra note 21, at 489. See also Flemming v. Arsenal Bldg. Corp., 38 F. Supp. 675
(S.D.N.Y. 1940). However, even ifjurisdiction could, for unnamed reasons, be said to exist
under the statute, other courts have refused to invoke jurisdiction and have denied similar
motions, Sale v. United States, 228 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1956) (possibly distinguishable on the
ground that motion was not made until commencement of enforcement proceedings), or
denied that a claim of privilege even affords basis for a motion to quash a summons in the
nature of a subpoena ad testificandum or duces tecum. Application of Burr, 171 F. Supp.
448 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
23 The court argued that since the motion to quash here is a device to obtain judicial
determination of the validity of the IRS summons without the risk of sanctions for noncompliance under § 7210 of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, its denial is like the dismissal of a complaint. But Soja v. Davis, 303 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. granted,371 U.S. 810 (1962),
held that the issuance of a writ of attachment as a means of judicial enforcement pursuant
to § 7604 was interlocutory and not appealable as it did not conclude the proceedings. See
note 4 supra, note 49 infra.The Seventh Circuit's decision as to appealability of attachment
orders seems questionable, even when viewed in the light of Cobbledick v. United States,
309 U.S. 323 (1940), on which it purported to rely. The Cobbledick case involved an appeal
from an order declining to quash a grand jury subpoena. Review was denied, the court
distinguishing cases holding that judicial orders enforcing ICC subpoenas were appealable.
The court did not rely on the Soja distinction between motions to quash and contempt
attachments on the one hand and enforcement orders on the other. Rather it noted that
denial of finality to a lower court order "is a phase of the distribution of authority within
the judicial hierarchy. But a proceeding like that under.., the Interstate Commerce Act
may be deemed self-contained... there is not, as in the case of a grand jury or trial, any
further judicial inquiry which would be halted were the offending witness permitted to
appeal." Id. at 330.
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In that case, a summoned attorney objected that compulsory production of
data demanded by the IRS relating to the filing of his clients' income tax
returns would constitute a violation of the attorney-client privilege. 24 Noncompliance with the IRS summons might have subjected the attorney to
criminal sanctions under section 7210 of the Internal Revenue Code. The
court maintained that this provision is "much more drastic than the usual
provisions as to subpoenas by administrative agencies... ,"25 and thus requires application of the principle of Exparte Young 26 and Oklahoma Operat-

ing Co. v. Love. 27 The court noted, however, that "if the statutory scheme were
like that for enforcement of subpoenas of such agencies as the Interstate
Commerce Commission... or the Civil Aeronautics Board... there would
be merit in the government's position that courts ought not intervene at so

early a stage ....2 8 Under the court's view of the latter statutes, no penalty

could attach for noncompliance until compliance had been judicially ordered.
In Colton, consideration of the motion to vacate was a device to afford
judicial determination of the validity of the summons before risk of penalty
for noncompliance attached. 29
The decision seems grounded expressly on a constitutional principle; 30 and
if prior review is not constitutionally required or provided by statute, the
courts are without jurisdiction to review.31 Even if review is required, of
24
The case did not go to the merits of the attorney's objections but only to his opportunity to offer them without risk of sanction. The trial court subsequently denied the motion
to vacate and partially granted the government petition for judicial enforcement of the
second summons pursuant to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 7602(b), 7604. In re Colton, 201
F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd sub nom. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.
1962).
25 291 F.2d at 489. But see Reisman v. Caplin, No. 16690, pp. 6-7, D.C. Cir., Feb. 7,
1963.
26 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
27 252 U.S. 331 (1920).
28 291 F.2d at 490.
29 Id. at 491. An action for a declaratory judgment would thus seem more appropriate.
See Borchard, Challenging "Penal" Statutesby DeclaratoryAction, 52 YALE L.J. 445 (1943).
The court is silent as to any requirement that the petitioner request the agency to quash
the subpoena. Cf. FTC v. Waltham Watch Co., 169 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). On the
unwillingness of courts to supply extra-statutory review where administrative remedies have
not been pursued, see Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 123 (1946), and the treatment
there of Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
30 See 75 HARv. L. Rav. 1222, 1223 (1962). The court later denied, however, without
explanation, that the decision is constitutionally required, In re Turner, 309 F.2d 69, 72
(2d Cir. 1962), reciting only that "the result reached was inherent in the statutory scheme."
31
However, where the statutory scheme is such as to enlist the ultimate aid of enforcement courts, any duty to provide review implied from statute is a constitutional duty also:
"[Jlurisdiction always is jurisdiction only to decide constitutionally." Hart, supra note 11, at
1402.
Of course it can be argued that issuance of the subpoena itself constitutes extra-judicial
governmental coercion. In such a case the Supreme Court has held that the courts can
provide review apart from the constitutional requirement that bids them do so when acting
as enforcement agencies. Thus in United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949), the Court in
construing a silent statute observed that the act's "careful provision for judicial protection
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course, the method of review adopted should be the one involving the minimum interference with the statutory scheme. 32 The procedure suggested by
Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love and detailed in Part IV of this comment,
rather than the injunction utilized in Colton and detailed in Part I, seems to
involve the minimum of interference.
The reasoning of the Colton court that the existence of penalty provisions
necessitates providing prior opportunity to question validity, if accepted,
squarely presents a question as to the best procedure for providing such a
prior challenge. Four alternative methods may be proposed. First, as in Colton,
the principle of Ex parte Young may be invoked to enjoin or quash the subpoena. Second, the injunctive procedure requirement of irreparable injury may
be dispensed with by recourse to the declaratory judgment statute. Third, a
colorable doubt as to the validity of the subpoena may be treated as defeating
the exaction of penalties for noncompliance with a summons found valid.
Fourth, recourse may be had to the procedure utilized in Oklahoma Operating
Co. v. Love by enjoining the collection of penalties when an enforcement
proceeding has been instituted and the reasons for noncompliance are reasonable. Each of these four approaches satisfies conflicting interests in the law
to varying degrees. On one hand are the basic demands of justice and fair
play to the subpoenaed witness which find expression in constitutional principles. On the other is the public interest in efficient public administration both
33
to secure the benefits of statutory policies and to prevent delay in the courts.
I. QUASHING OF THE SUBPOENA

The principle of Exparte Young arose from a derivative suit by stockholders
in a railroad company to enjoin the company's observance of rate schedules
for intrastate railroad operation and to enjoin the state attorney general perof railroads against improper Commission awards argues against interpretation of the same
section to deny shippers any judicial review whatever" Id. at 435. This argument from the
statutory scheme would appear similar to that made by the Second Circuit in Colton.

A three-judge dissenting opinion (per Frankfurter, J.), however, took the view that

"unless Congress has chosen to give the courts oversight of a determination by the Commission, the courts have not the power of oversight where, as here, the Constitution does not
require it." Id. at 449. The future willingness of the courts to provide remedies beyond those
constitutionally required will depend on their views as to the proper functions of legislature
and judiciary, that is, on their willingness to exercise jurisdiction not explicitly conferred
by statute. Cf. note 22 supra. Compare 4 DAVIS § 28.09.
32
See generally Brandeis' concurring opinion in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341
(1936); cf. 4 DAVIS 93: "The Court's technique for leaving the constitutional question open

is simply to review to the extent that the Constitution might require review, no matter how
clear the statute may be in cutting off review."
33 See, e.g., In re Magnus, Mabee & Reynard, Inc., Docket No. 27813, 2d Cir., Dec. 6,
1962, where, due to delays resulting from appellants' efforts to avoid compliance with a
summons issued by the IRS, the government was forced to secure an indictment against
the taxpayers before the summons could be enforced in order to prevent the statute of
limitations on criminal prosectuions from running.

514

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:508

sonaly 34 from enforcing the schedules. Suit was brought on the grounds that
the rates were so low as to be confiscatory and that the penalties for noncompliance with the schedules were so severe as to preclude effective legal challenge
of the schedules. The Supreme Court held that the district court had jurisdiction to enjoin the threatened enforcement of the schedules since the penalties for noncompliance were so harsh as to force railroads to comply rather
than risk unsuccessful challenge. Thus the penalties constituted a denial of
due process and were unconstitutional on their face regardless of the validity
of the schedules themselves.
In a federal context the principle has been invoked to accord equity courts
jurisdiction to provide methods of review thereby avoiding the need to declare
penalty provisions in federal statutes unconstitutional. Thus in Estep v. United
States,35 the Court construed the section of the Selective Training and Service
Act of 1940 providing that the decision of local boards is "final" to mean only
that the customary scope of judicial review was to be restricted, and held that
a limited review sufficient to invalidate sham proceedings might still be allowed.
By denying that Congress had meant what its words said, the Court was
able to avoid declaring unconstitutional the classification system created by
the Act. However, the federal courts are bound by state construction of state
law and are less free to provide non-statutory remedies for review of state
administrative action as alternatives to declarations of unconstitutionality
where review is required and is not provided by statute. For a "review of state
procedure by a federal court, proceeds in terms of due process rather than
separation of powers." 36
The case of Ex parte Young distinguished enactments whose validity depends "upon the existence of a fact which can be determined only after investigation of a very sophisticated and technical character... " where equity
might intervene, from legislation requiring no such investigation and over
which the jurisdiction of the legislature is complete, where equity will not
intervene.37 Thus, the rule of the case is not generally available to challenge
a statute establishing an ordinary criminal offense. 38 The Court also observed
that "it is doubtless true that the State may impose penalties, such as will tend
34

In Exparte Young, the defendant attorney general had threatened suit. For a view that
the existence of the statute alone would have constituted the requisite threat to justify judicial intervention, see Borchard, supra note 29; Note, 50 YALE L.J. 1278 (1941); cf.note 54
infra.

35 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
36

JAUE & NATHANSON, ADMqINSRAT

LAW 905 (2d ed. 1961).

37 209 U.S. at 148. This test was adopted in United States v. Clyde S.S. Co., 36 F.2d

691, 694 (2d Cir. 1929).
38 Douglas v. Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Whisler v. City of West Plains, 137 F.2d
938 (8th Cir. 1943); Spence v. Cole, 137 F.2d 71 (4th Cir. 1943); see also Borchard, supra
note 29.
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to compel obedience to its mandates by all .... -39 Even extreme or cumulative penalties are not improper per se: They are unconstitutional when im-

40
posed simply to prevent contest of the validity of the statute.
It has been suggested that the equitable jurisdiction recognized by Ex parte
Young exists only in situations like rate-reduction cases where, by complying
with the schedules "pending judicial contest of the validity of the order, the
contestant would, in case of success, nevertheless suffer confiscation and unrecoverable loss of property through having collected during the period of
contest only the unlawfully reduced rate." 41 It has also been suggested that
the basis of equitable jurisdiction is the threat of penalties and private damage
suits arising from failure to comply while good faith doubt exists as to

validity.42

If equity would intervene only in those cases where compliance itself ultimately presents as great a threat as that immediately presented by the noncompliance penalties, then the petititioner in Colton would probably be without standing to seek judicial intervention. The injury to his reputation and
his capacity to deal with his clients should he comply is real but seems too
indirect. 43 Even if equity will intervene whenever an order can be tested only
at the risk of substantial penalties, it may still be doubted that the petitioner
in Colton was confronted with any substantial risk.
The Colton court distinguishes the threat to the noncomplying witness
posed by the subpoenas of the IRS from those of the Civil Aeronautics Board.
The distinction, if meaningful, is not that the CAB lacks direct sanction for
noncompliance with its process, for the CAB and the IRS have virtually
39 209 U.S. at 146, quoting Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 318 U.S. 79, 102
(1901). See United States v. Clyde S.S. Co., 36 F.2d 691, 695 (2d Cir. 1929), where the court
observes that a penalty of $500 a day does not seem confiscatory since a small penalty would
be no inducement to compliance.
40 209 U.S. at 147; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., supra note 39, at 102. The
principle of Exparte Young has often been applied. It is not impossible, however, to conceive
of a statute so drafted as to permit an initial constitutional test free of the threat of penalty,
thus giving substance to the dictum that extreme penalties are not improper per se. The fact,
however, that the validity of a statute might be determined in a collateral proceeding (like
the derivative suit in Ex parte Young itself) would seem insufficient to vindicate a statute
with extreme penalties.
41 Bartlett Frazier Co. v. Hyde, 65 F.2d 350, 353 (7th Cir. 1933). This is not, however,
an argument for judicial intervention where the statutory penalties are not extreme or
cumulative. Compare Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U.S. 331, 336-37 (1920), which
emphasizes the burden of the penalties, not the costs of compliance.
4
2 Central Ky. Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Ky., 37 F.2d 938 (E.D. Ky.
1930); see Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300 (1937); Oklahoma Operating
Co. v. Love, supra note 41; FTC v. Millers' Nat'l Fed'n, 23 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
43 See Guaranty Underwriters, Inc. v. Johnson, 133 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1943). But see Bank
of America v. Douglas, 105 F.2d 100 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
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identical powers, 44 but that it more rarely exercises the power that it does
possesS. 45 The main reliance of the administrative agencies has been upon
judicial enforcement of subpoenas :46 Seldom, if ever, do the agencies seek the
imposition of direct criminal penalties for noncompliance. 47 And even judicial
enforcement is resorted to relatively infrequently. 48 The IRS, considering the
bulk of its work, hardly seems to depart from this pattern. Of the forty-five
reported cases that have arisen over twenty years enforcement of IRS sub-

poenas, 49 all but one50 arose as civil proceedings for judicial enforcement.

Even if criminal penalties are considered to fall within the ambit of Ex parte
Young, it seems absurd to consider the petitioner in Colton under a threat of
prosecution so immediate as to support equitable jurisdiction to intervene. 5 1
44 Compare INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 7210 (Any person who "neglects to appear or to
produce such books.., or other papers, shall, upon conviction thereof.. ." be subject to
fine or imprisonment or both.), with Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 784 (1958), 49
U.S.C. § 1472(g) (1958), set out in text accompanying note 14 supra.
45
In the more than twenty years since the study by the United States Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure, only one case has been reported as arising under
the CAA-CAB-FAA subpoena power and that was a civil proceeding for judicial enforcement, CAB v. Hermann, 353 U.S. 322 (1957).
46 1 DAvis § 3.11; Comment, supra note 3, at 1541.
47
E.g., "except for one indictment in 1935 against a person who died before trial, and
an information filed in 1958 against a fugitive who failed to respond to an order to show
cause in a subpoena-enforcement proceeding, the Commission has never attempted to
enforce any of these provisions. And this is typical of other agencies as well." 3 Loss,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 1965. See UNrrED STATEs ATroRNEY GEmNtAL's CoMmrrrEE ON ADMINIS'MATrIVE PROCEDURE, MONOGRAPHS (1940), detailing the operation of the several

agencies.
48

See, e.g., UNrTED STATES ATroRNEY GENERA'S COMMITTEE ON ADMIISTRATVE PRO-

CEDURE, MONOGRAPH No. 1, at25 (1940) (administration of Walsh-Healy Act); MONOGRAPH

No. 3, at 47-48 (1940) (FCC); MONOGRAPH No. 18, at 42-43 (1940) (NLRB). Conclusions
are reported in the Committee's report, Administrative Procedurein GovernmentalAgencies,
S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 414 (1941). Some agencies make almost no use of the
subpoena power itself. See MONOGRAPH No. 2, at 50-51 (1939) (VA); MONOGRAPH No. 12,
at 70 (1940) (Wage & Hour Division of Dep't of Labor); MONOGRAPH No. 8, at 33 (1940)
(Railroad Retirement Board).
49
Significantly, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 7604(b), providing for attachment as for contempt is consistently treated as a procedure for the judicial enforcement of IRS subpoenas
rather than as a direct sanction for noncompliance as suggested in Colton, 291 F.2d at 48990. See note 4 supra.
so United States v. Becker, 259 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 929 (1959).
51 The reports are generally barren of details but there seems to be nothing in the language
of the subpoena to make the witness apprehensive of prosecution. The subpoena set out in
International Commodities Corp. v. IRS, 224 F.2d 882, 883 (2d Cir. 1955), warns only that
"failure to comply with this summons will render you liable to proceedings in the district
court of the United States for the district in which you reside, to compel your attendance,
testimony, and production of books, etc." But see Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery,
302 U.S. 300 (1937); FTC v. Millers' Nat'l Fed'n, 23 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1927); S & W
Cafeteria of Tenn. v. Aird, 60 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Tenn. 1945).
The reports, however, are scant indication of the actual formal and informal practices
of the agencies. If petitioner could establish that agency practice did in fact create a signifi-
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II. RELIEF BY DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
If a threat can be said to face the objecting witness it is the latent power
of the subpoenaing agency to seek the imposition of criminal sanctions. Although there is not such an immediate threat of irremediable injury as would
support a suit for injunction, some commentators52 have suggested that the
very existence of a statute imposing penal sanctions creates a sufficient threat
to provide the "case of actual controversy" necessary to support a proceeding
for a declaratory judgment. 53 An attempt has been made to qualify this view
by making a dubious distinction between statutes that vest discretion in prosecutors and statutes that are said not to do so.54 In fact, in nearly all cases where
extraordinary relief has been granted, courts have at least recited a threat of
enforcement. 5 5 FTC v. ClaireFurnaceC0.56 dismissed for want of jurisdiction
a suit to enjoin the enforcement of Commission orders to produce certain
detailed information. The Court argued that since the Commission itself could
cant fear of prosecution although prosecution had not been explicitly threatened, then
declaratory relief should be available. In this context the disparity in agency practice, little
discussed here, is critical. Compare Hall v. Lemke, TRADE REG. REP. (1962 Trade Case.)
70,338 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 1962) with Brody v. United States, 243 Fed. 378 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957). If prosecution actually were presently threatened, an injunction
probably would be available. Hall v. Lemke, supra.
52 Borchard, supra note 29; Note, 50 YALE L.i. 1278 (1941). On ripeness problems
generally, see 3 DAVIS §§ 21.05-06, and on the related exhaustion problem, see 3 DAvis
§ 20.03. See also Developments in the Law-DeclaratoryJudgments, 62 HIAvv. L. REv. 787
(1949), and the realistic standard of "relative certainty" there developed.
53 Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dictum in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 551-52 (1946),
would indicate that a proceeding for declaratory relief is appropriate only where the controversy would be justiciable as a suit for an injunction. See also, e.g., Macauley v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540, 545 n.4 (1946). The better view would seem to be that the standards
are not the same. Note, 56 YALE L.J. 139 (1946); Note, supra note 52. The controversy,
of course, must be real and immediate. Public Serv. Comm'n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344
U.S. 237 (1952); Eccles v. Peoples' Bank of Lakewood, 333 U.S. 426 (1948); Ashwander
v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936); see generally Borchard, The Next Step Beyond Equity-The
DeclaratoryAction, 13 U. Cmu. L. REv. 145 (1946); Developments, supra note 52; Comment,
62 CoLUM. L. REv. 206 (1962). 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1958) provides that a declaration of rights
is available "whether or not further relief is or could be sought." (Emphasis added.)
54 Note, supra note 52, at 1284. The note attacks the reasoning developed in Ex parte
La Prade, 289 U.S. 444 (1933), (criticized, Note, 43 YALE L.J. 500 (1934)), and Southern
Pacific Co. v. Conway, 115 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1940), and preserved in Fer. R. Civ. P. 25(d)
making official threat of enforcement a requisite element of a justiciable challenge of a
criminal statute. The leading case of Ex parte Young presumed, without discussion, the
necessity of a threat of enforcement.
55 See 3 DAvis § 21.05. In particular, see Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958).
s6 274 U.S. 160 (1927). Suit for injunction here, like the motion to vacate in Colton,
is used to effect a declaration of rights. Procedurally, the witness would prefer the ex parte
motion to vacate the subpoena to an adversary declaratory judgment proceeding and would
prefer the declaratory judgment to an injunction since irremediable injury need not be shown
in the former case and there are other procedural and calendar advantages. See Borchard,
supra note 53, at 158.
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impose no penalties but was empowered only to ask the Attorney General
to seek judicial enforcement or to institute an action to recover penalties for

noncompliance, a suit in equity was premature until the Attorney General at
his discretion5 7 instituted either proceeding. FTC v. Maynard Coal Co. 5 8 extended the rule by holding that suit to enjoin the enforcement of Commission

subpoenas is premature following the mere filing by the Commission of notice
of default, where penalties do not begin to run until thirty days after the
notice is filed.
But the Second Circuit in United States v. St. Regis Paper Co.5 9 suggested
that the passage of the declaratory judgment statute nullified the rule requiring

threat of prosecution. 60 The court questioned the rule itself, observing that "if
judicial review were in fact limited to enforcement proceedings instituted by

the Commission, and a daily forfeiture were collected for a failure to comply,
the procedure might not meet the established standards of due process." 6 1 It
held that jurisdiction will lie under the declaratory judgment statute to test
the demand of an administrative agency for special reports. 62 "The respondent
bringing such an action would be effectively denied judicial review if he is

permitted no forum in which to challenge the validity and scope of the agency's
order; his injury, therefore, is immediate enough to warrant judicial intervention even if the agency is not prepared to institute court proceedings to
achieve compliance." 63 And only if such review is available can the penalty
64
provisions withstand attack as a denial of due process.
On certiorari the Supreme Court,65 however, declined to go so far. It distin57 Federal Trade Comm'n Act, 38 Stat. 723 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 50 (1958), however, declares that "it shall be the duty of the various United States attorneys, under the direction
of the Attorney General of the United States, to prosecute for the recovery of forfeitures."
ClaireFurnace discussed the recovery of forfeitures as a remedial civil remedy rather than
a punitive criminal penalty, FTC v. Millers' Nat'l Fed'n, 23 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1927), but
in the imposition of money penalties, at least, forfeitures and flat fines are essentially similar.
And there is no distinction in the Act between the acts from which liability for civil or for
criminal sanctions arises.
58 22 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
59 285 F.2d 607 (2d Cir.), affirming inpart andreversingin part181 F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
60 285 F.2d at 615. Ironically, recovery of penalty forfeitures was allowed on the ground
that since there was opportunity to challenge the Commission order before penalties for noncompliance attached, it was fair to penalize a noncomplying witness who awaited mandamus
proceedings to make his challenge. But see concurring opinion of Friendly, J., id. at 616.
61 Id. at 615.
62 Ibid. The court expressly reserved judgment on whether the order to produce retained
file copies was a subpoena within the meaning of § 6(c) of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(c) (1958). 285 F.2d at 615. But it was so treated
in the district court, 181 F. Supp. at 868; Brief for Petitioner, p. 19, St. Regis Paper Co. v.
United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961), and is so treated in this discussion.
63 285 F.2d at 615.
64 Id. at 616.
65 St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961).
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guished Claire Furnace and possibly Maynard Coal observing that, in the
former case, "the Commission... had not issued any notice of default on
the orders, as was done here, nor had the orders been forwarded to the
Attorney General for enforcement." 66 The Court remarked only that a proceeding for declaratory judgment "appears sufficient to meet petitioner's
needs." 67 However, a declaration of rights at some time after the notice of
default could not meet the needs of the individual subject to criminal penalties68 and also, if forthcoming only after the Commission had forwarded the
orders to the Attorney General for enforcement, would not meet the needs
of the corporation subject to civil forfeitures.
III. GOOD FAITH NONCOMPLIANCE AS

MrITGATION

The suggestion that penal statutes providing penalties for noncompliance
should be strictly constred69 so as to require proof of lack of good faith as
an element of the offense7O does not seem likely to afford the individual witness any protection. Even those statutes requiring that criminal noncompliance
be "willful" have not always been construed to permit a good faith challenge
to go without penalty.7 1 FPC v. MetropolitanEdison Co.72 declares only that
66 Id. at 226. The distinction creates new uncertainties. Claire Furnace held that until
the Attorney General acted there could be no justiciable controversy. 274 U.S. at 174. By
the shift in the focus of attention from the Attorney General's to the Commission's discretion, the status of ClaireFurnaceis cast in doubt. While the Court still appears to hold that
issuance of a notice of default by the Commission is a necessary condition to declaratory
relief, whether it is a sufficient condition is unclear.
67 368 U.S. at 227.
6
8Itis the fact of noncompliance and not the timing of later judicial proceedings that
places the witness in jeopardy. Brief for United States, p. 58, St. Regis Paper Co. v. United
States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961). If the declaration is sought after noncompliance it offers no
protection and is probably denied, in any event, on the reasoning of Douglas v. City of
Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943). And if declaration is sought before the return date it is probably open to attack for prematurity. See United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
Similarly the stay suggested by the Supreme Court in St. Regis, 368 U.S. at 226, may protect
the defaulting corporation from the running of forfeitures but is of no protection to the
individual subject to flat criminal penalties.
69 St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 230 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting
and affirming the view of the district court, 181 F. Supp. 862, 869 (1960)); Flemming v. Arsenal Bldg. Corp., 38 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). See United States v. National Biscuit Co.,
25 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
70
See 368 U.S. at 230.
71But cf. Reisman v. Caplin, No. 16690, D.C. Cir., Feb. 17, 1963, p. 7 n.4: "The position
of the Assistant United States Attorney on this appeal is that a criminal prosecution under
Section 7210 of the Revenue Code, referred to in Application of Colton ...would not follow
from a good faith refusal to comply with a revenue summons."
An exception is the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 899 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(c) (1958), which has been unequivocally construed to admit good faith noncompliance
as a defense. Guaranty Underwriters, Inc. v. Johnson, 133 F.2d 54, 56 (5th Cir. 1943). That
Act, however, is unique in that it requires that criminal noncompliance be "without just
cause"--language found in only three other acts: Public Utility Holding Co. Act of 1935, 49
Stat. 831 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79r(d) (1958); Investment Co. Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 842 (1940),
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"the qualification that the refusal be 'willful' fully protects one whose refusal
is made in good faith and upon grounds which entitle him to the judgment of
the court before obedience is compelled." 73 This language may mean nothing
more than express recognition that the invalidity of the subpoena will be a
defense to criminal action for noncompliance. 74 Although it is a misdemeanor
"willfully" to default when summoned by the authority of Congress, 75 "no
moral turpitude is involved. Intentional violation is sufficient to constitute
guilt." 76 "A witness may exercise his privilege of refusing to answer questions
and submit to a court the correctness of his judgment in so doing, but in the
event he is mistaken as to the law it is no defense, for he is bound rightly to
77
construe the statute."
There is only one instance, other than the special circumstances of the
Guaranty Underwriters case,78 in which good faith noncompliance has been
recognized as a bar to criminal proceedings. A witness declined to comply
with a congressional subpoena oh the advice of counsel on a question of law
as to which the witness was in bona fide doubt and as to which the law was,
15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(c) (1958); Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 853 (1940), 15
U.S.C. § 80b-9(c) (1958). All are administered by the SEC which seldom exercises its direct
sanctions. See note 47 supra.
73 Id. at 387. (Emphasis added.)
-72 365 U.S. 375 (1938).
74 It is, for instance, no defense to criminal contempt proceedings for violation of an
injunction granted by a court of competent jurisdiction that the injunction was improvidently
granted and struck down on review. It is, however, a defense that the enjoining court was
without jurisdiction. See Cox, The Void Order and the Duty to Obey, 16 U. Cm. L. REV.
86 (1948).
Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946), and Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414
(1944), go no further than to make availability of the defense of invalidity a constitutional
necessity. Estep permits restriction of the review of validity to narrow grounds and appears
to require only that the order not be based on a sham proceeding. Yakus permitted restriction of the trial of the issue of validity to the Emergency Court of Appeals, a forum necessarily different from that in which the criminal prosecution for noncompliance would be
brought, and limited review there to the ninety days immediately following promulgation
of the objected to-order. It should be noted, however, that the results in both cases derive
some support from the war power. But cf. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 328
(1940): "Whatever right [the subpoenee] may have requires no further protection.., than
that afforded by the district court until the witness chooses to disobey and is committed
for contempt." (Emphasis added.) See note 23 supra.
75 52 Stat. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1958): "Every person who having been summoned
as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress... willfully makes default or who,
having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor...." punishable by fine or imprisonment.
76 Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 (1929). See Fields v. United States, 164
F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1947), ecrt. denied, 332 U.S. 851 (1948); Townsend v. United States, 95
F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 664 (1938).
77
Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d at 361.
78 Guaranty Underwriters, Inc. v. Johnson, 133 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1943). See note 71 supra.
Compare Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942), where
in agency minute providing immunity from prosecution for an initial violation to test a
new rule was held insufficient to justify denial of an injunction against its enforcement. See
3 DAvis 151-55.
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in fact, uncertain. 79 The Second Circuit in St. Regis, however, refused to read
into the Federal Trade Commission Act even this limited restriction on liability. The petitioner company had declined to produce retained file copies of
80
census reports on the ground that the reports were confidential. The objecof doubt
the
basis
tion was made in good faith and on reasonable grounds on
and on
Court
as to a question that had never been decided by the Supreme
favored
that
opinion
opinion-an
which there was only a single circuit court
the petitioner's view. 81 Still the court said "that the respondent's recalcitrance
was caused by a wrong guess on a disputed issue of law does not prevent it
from being held to 'lawful consequences attached to the refusal.' "82 The only
mitigation of the "statute's absolute and imperative terms" that the court
suggested was that accorded to "a single oversight or an honest mistake in a
good faith attempt to comply with the Commission's order. .... 83
IV. INJUNCTION OF CRIMINAL PIENALTIBs WHERE THERE
HAS BEEN GOOD FArH NONCOMPLIANCE

Upon government institution of a criminal action based on noncompliance,
the witness probably may bring suit to enjoin the imposition of penalties, thus
supplying himself with protection where he acted in good faith. The petitioner
4
in the well-known case of Oklahoma Operating Co. v. LoveS challenged the
rate schedules controlling its operation. The Supreme Court held that the
petitioner was entitled to a temporary injunction restraining the imposition
of the penalties for noncompliance with the rate schedules pending hearing
79 Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352, 359 (D.C. Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 303
U.S. 664 (1938). The defense was said to arise from Murdock v. United States, 290 U.S.
389 (1933), which construes a section of the Internal Revenue Statute relating to filing
of tax returns. But the Court there looked less to the uncertainty of the law and petitioner's
doubts, 290 U.S. at 396, than to the context of the statute itself, concluding that "willfully"
denoted morally culpable behavior. Id. at 395-96.
80 Section 9(a) of the Census Act, 68 Stat. 1013 (1954), 13 U.S.C. § 9(a)(1958), provides
that neither the Secretary of Commerce nor any officer or employee of the Department of
Commerce or of any bureau or agency thereof may "permit anyone other than the sworn
officers and employees of the Department or bureau or agency thereof to examine the individual reports." See 36 Ops. Arr'y GEN. 362 (1930). The agency contended that this
prohibition did not prevent demand of petitioner company's records and analogized to the
income taxpayer's retained file copies of returns which are subject to subpoena. United
States v. O'Mara, 122 F. Supp. 399 (D.D.C. 1954).
81 FTC v. Dilger, 276 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1960), rejected the analogy to retained file
copies of income tax returns and held the census reports confidential. Ironically, after the
Supreme Court rejected Dilger in St. Regis, Congress amended § 9(a) of the Census Act
to provide that no agency or officer of the government shall require the production of retained
records of census reports and that "copies of census reports which have been so retained
shall be immune from legal process, and shall not, without the consent of the individual or
establishment concerned, be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose in any action,
suit or other judicial or administrative proceeding." 76 Stat. 922 (1962), 13 U.S.C. § 9(a)
(1962).

82 285 F.2d at 614.

83 Ibid.

84 252 U.S. 331 (1920), 18 Mtcf. L. REv. 804 (1920).
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of the cause and that "if upon final hearing the maximum rates fixed should
be found not to be confiscatory, a permanent injunction should, nevertheless
issue to restrain enforcement of penalties accrued pendente lite, provided that
it also be found that the plaintiff had reasonable ground to contest them as
85
being confiscatory."
Thus the witness is not without procedures, consistent with the public

interest in efficient public administration, by which to protect himself.86 Although it can be recommended that section 10(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act87 be amended to articulate clearly the availability of such injunctive relief and thereby minimize conflicts in practice between the circuits, there
is adequate foundation for seeking such an injunction even without statutory

revision. Indeed, injunction of the imposition of penalties is probably presently
available under section 10(d) which provides that, to avoid irreparable injury,
the court may issue "all necessary and appropriate process ... to preserve
status or rights" pending review.
Professor Paul Freund has suggested by implication that such injunctive
relief may presently be limited in availability to cases involving continuing
forfeitures or orders imposed upon respondents under a continuing duty to
serve or its equivalent. 88 In HighlandFarms Dairy Co. v. Agnew, 8 9 however,
a district court declined to enjoin the operation of a newly created milk
85 252 U.S. at 338. The Court held the penalty provisions of the state statute void on their
face, following Ex parte Young. See p. 512 supra.However, the injunction of enforcement
of penalties was independent of this holding, since a subsequent amendment to the statute
provided adequate review and the Supreme Court, instead of leaving petitioner to his state
remedy, allowed the district court to retain jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of
the rates. It was in this context that the injunction against enforcement of penalties was
granted.
86 The procedures previously discussed would place a serious burden upon the administrative process not justified by any threat to the witness. See Flemming v. Arsenal Bldg.
Corp., 38 F. Supp. 675, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). It would be a cruel irony if the mere existence
of the power to seek direct sanctions for noncompliance justified judicial intervention. The
existence of the criminal provisions is an aid in obtaining compliance, even though penalties
are rarely sought. See I DAvis § 2.12 n.1. The presence of strong tools to encourage promptness should not be made grounds for imposing delay on the administrative process. And
if the agency were compelled to prove bad faith when it chose to use the criminal provisions,
the effectiveness of the sanction might be seriously reduced. See 3 Loss, SEcuarrrss REGULATION 1965 (1961).

87 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(d) (1958).
88 FREUND, THE SuPREME COURT OF THE UNIED STATES 65

(1961): "If [the]... constitu-

tional challenge were a reasonable one, though finally rejected, might it not be possible to
enjoin prosecution for the interim violations in the interest of removing a clog on the process
of constitutional adjudication? Something of the kind has been done where a public utility
has no means of challenging an order other than violation and exposure to multiple penalties. Of course the utility is under a duty to serve.... The case of the distributor of leaflets
is relegated to a lower level unless it is recognized that the duty to serve may find an equivalent in the public interest in freedom of expression in marginal cases while the validity of a
restraint is being tested."
89 16 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Va. 1936).
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commission where one of the claims raised was that the penalties for noncompliance with the subpoenas issued by the commission were so severe as to
constitute a denial of due process. Noncompliance was punishable by fines of
up to one hundred dollars or by imprisonment for up to ninety days for each
offense. The court reasoned that "the procedure to be followed with regard
to such penalties, when the enforcement of the orders of a[n] ... administrative body is resisted on constitutional grounds, is suggested ...in Oklahoma
Operating Co. v. Love....."90 Other courts have also indicated by way of
dictum that the power to enjoin the collection of penalties is a general equity
power. 91
It will be admitted that "colorable doubt," "reasonable ground" and "good
faith" are only vaguely defined terms and that the witness who seeks in good
faith to challenge a subpoena served upon him does not do so without some
risk. But there are uncertainties in much of the law and the risk that such a
witness assumes is slight. A too precise definition of good faith may well,
unfortunately, only encourage bad faith. It might also be contended that
conviction for noncompliance, even if no penalty is imposed, imposes a social
stigma that the morally blameless should not be compelled to bear and that
might itself coerce compliance and thus work a denial of due process. However, it is yet uncertain in the law even that the risk of criminal penalties
following prosecution will render justiciable a suit for the injunction of prosecution pending the test of a statute of questionable constitutionality.9 2 No
cases raise to the level of justiciability, let alone denial of due process, the
possible social stigma of criminal proceedings per se, where no risk of penalty
is involved.
Allowance of suits brought after noncompliance to enjoin the imposition
of penalties would afford to the aggrieved witness the opportunity to be
heard in court without practical fear of sanctions for a reasonable but unsuccessful attack upon the process of an administrative agency. While one trial is
generally to be preferred to two, such a procedure actually works to ease the
burdens on the witness, the agency and the courts. It does away with the need
for prosecution and defense of suits brought to prevent the possible infliction
of criminal sanctions seldom utilized by agencies, and relieves courts of suits
based on remote hypotheses. The proposed procedure would preserve to the
agency its sanctions against contumacy or dilatory conduct, sanctions which
would be vitiated if judicial intervention before violation were allowed, or if
the burden of pressing the issue of good faith were not placed upon the witness.
90 Id.at 585. Cf. Ohio Custom Garment v. Lind, 13 F. Supp. 533 (S.D. Ohio 1936).
See also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 437-38 (1944).
91 Otoe County Nat'l Bank v. Delaney, 88 F.2d 238, 243 (8th Cir. 1937); Connecticut

Fire92Ins. Co. v. McNeil, 35 F.2d 675, 676 (6th Cir. 1929).

See Comment, Threat of Enforcement-Prerequisiteof a Justiciable Controversy, 61
CoLuM. L. REv. 106 (1962). Professor Davis has urged a broader standard of review. See
3 DAvis 141-68.

